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Recently several states have launched investigations of
certain MCI telephone call routings based on competitors' claims
that the company eliminated or reduced payments it should have
made.2 The MCI investigations may uncover instances of unlawful
practices designed to shore up revenues, reduce payments to local
exchange carriers for call delivery, avoid tax liability and shift
local exchange access payment burdens to other carriers. Perhaps
more significantly the investigations may trigger closer scrutiny of
numerous strategies and tactics used by telecommunications
carriers to reduce payments they make to other carriers. Also, this
scrutiny may call attention to how carriers exploit inconsistent
regulatory treatment of functionally the same services. A fuzzy
line separates lawful efforts to achieve least cost routing of traffic
on one hand, and deliberate efforts unlawfully to reduce or avoid
financial obligations by deceiving other carriers as to where a call
originated on the other hand.
3
Regulatory asymmetry occurs when telecommunications
service providers offer identical services, but incur different
government oversight burdens. More extensive regulation, the
duty to pay higher regulatory or legislative fees, and subsidy
obligations may apply to carriers based on artificial classifications
of services they offer such as geographical scope (intrastate versus
interstate) and type (telecommunications as a stand alone service
Rob Frieden is a Professor of Telecommunications at Pennsylvania State
University.
2 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, MCIDisputes Fraud Claim By AT&T, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2003, at Cl; Christopher Stem, WorldCom Says Its Probe Refutes AT&T
Claim; Bankrupt Phone Firm Tells Court No Evidence Was Found That It
Disguised Calls to Avoid Fees, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at El.
3 See Barnaby J. Feder, The Line Between Cost Management and Deceit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Cl.
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versus one where telecommunications is a minor element of an
information service). Additionally, inconsistent regulatory
treatment may occur based on carrier classifications using
historical market share and perceptions of its market power.
Existing "legacy" regulatory classifications4 have established
arbitrary dichotomies based on which regulatory agency has
jurisdiction, what services qualify for promotion through favorable
regulatory treatment, and how carriers and regulators decide to
allocate costs.
Regulatory arbitrage5 results when stakeholders, such as
telecommunications service providers as MCI, exploit differences
4 The FCC has expressed a reluctance to apply legacy regulation when
conditions change. "Given our attempts to reduce the regulatory burden on
[incumbent local exchange carriers] ILECs, we are especially reluctant to
impose similar legacy regulation on new competitive carriers." Access Charge
Reform, 16 F.C.C.R. 9923, 9940 (2001). "I hope that, in future proceedings, the
Commission will be quicker to recognize that the reflexive extension of legacy
regulations to nascent technologies often harms the public interest." Provision
of Improved Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech
Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, 18 F.C.C.R.
4761, 4774 (2003).
5 The FCC typically refers to regulatory arbitrage without providing a definition.
"We recognize that the existing intercarrier compensation mechanism for the
delivery of this traffic, in which the originating carrier pays the carrier that
serves the ISP, has created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and distorted
the economic incentives related to competitive entry into the local exchange and
exchange access markets." Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-
Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 9152
(2001). One definition provided by the Commission characterizes regulatory
arbitrage as "businesses making decisions based on regulatory classifications
rather than on customers' preferences and innovative and sustainable business
plans." Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798,
4846 (2002). Another FCC definition is "profit-seeking behavior that can arise
when a regulated firm is required to set different prices for products or services
with a similar cost structure." Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation
Regime, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9616 n.18 (2001) [hereinafter Bill and Keep Carrier
Compensation Proposal] (referencing PATRICK DEGRABA, BILL AND KEEP AT
THE CENTRAL OFFICE AS THE EFFICIENT INTERCONNECTION REGIME 1 2 n.3
(F.C.C., O.P.P. Working Paper No. 33, 2000)); Patrick DeGraba, Central Office
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in legislative and regulatory classifications to accrue financial and
competitive advantages achieved by avoiding regulatory burdens,
or by foisting payment obligations onto other carriers.
This article will examine tactics designed to exploit
regulatory arbitrage with an eye toward identifying areas where
inconsistent regulatory treatment distorts the competitive
marketplace without offsetting public interest benefits. The article
concludes that legislatures and regulators should eliminate
opportunities to avoid regulatory burdens through routing and
service classification tactics unless compelling reasons persist for
maintaining regulatory asymmetry. The Federal Communications
Commission and state public utility commissions have established
numerous service definitions, territorial and cost allocation policies
based on public policy or political considerations that have become
unsustainable in light of technological developments. Many of
these policies now have costs that exceed the public benefits
particularly in light of the competitive distortions they create and
the flawed justifications and assumptions underlying the policies.
I. The Death of Distance
Technological developments in telecommunications and
information processing increasingly make it unsustainable for
operators to charge distance sensitive (mileage based) rates.6
Much of the installed plant costs incurred by telecommunications
carriers does not vary as a function of usage.7 Historically the
FCC and state regulatory agencies have encouraged carriers to
recover non-traffic sensitive costs on a metered basis 8 and to
Bill and Keep as a Unified Inter-Carrier Compensation Regime, 19 YALE J. ON
REG. 37 (2002).
6 See FRANCES CAIRNCROss, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: HOW THE
COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES (1997).
7 Non-traffic sensitive plant requires triggers costs that do not vary with the
degree of use. For example, the costs of procuring and installing a telephone
jack do not vary with the amount of calls made via that particular component.
The FCC acknowledged the need to recover non-traffic sensitive costs on a
flat-rate basis. "[N]on-traffic-sensitive costs-costs that do not vary with the
amount of traffic carried over the facilities-should be recovered through flat-
rate charges, and traffic-sensitive costs should be recovered through per-minute
recover many types of both non-traffic sensitive and traffic
sensitive costs by averazinz the different costs triggered by high
and low volume-users. S- Cost averaging provides a simple "rough
justice" solution to complex cost allocation problems,' 0 but it
blunts cost differences among carriers, routes and users.
Inefficient and inequitable investment recovery would occur if
carriers charged usage or mileage based charges to recoup such
charges. This approach fosters competition and efficient pricing." Access
Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for LECs, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,976,
14,977 (2003), available at 2003 WL 21544089.
9 Implicit subsidies in telecommunications "result, in large part from rate
averaging between rural and suburban/urban areas and the recovery of certain
non-traffic sensitive costs through traffic sensitive per minute rates, which over-
recovers costs from higher volume users, often business customers." Review of
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
CC Docket No. 01-338, 2003 WL 22175730, at *17078 n.509 (F.C.C. Aug. 21,
2003); see generally Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers, Low-Volume Long Distance Users, Federal-State
Joint Board On Universal Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 12,971-72 (2002)
(CALLS Order) (describing how high-volume users bear a greater share of the
non-traffic sensitive costs than low-volume users), affd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
10 The 1996 Act requires cost averaging to achieve universal service objectives:
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,
should have access to telecommunications and information
services, including interexchange services and advanced
telecommunications and information services, that are
reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban
areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably
comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban
areas.
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2003). Additionally,
the rates charged by providers of interexchange
telecommunications services to subscribers in rural and high
cost areas shall be no higher than the rates charged by each
such provider to its subscribers in urban areas. Such rules
shall also require that a provider of interstate interexchange
telecommunications services shall provide such services to its
subscribers in each State at rates no higher than the rates
charged to its subscribers in any other State.
Id. § 254(g).
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sunk and embedded costs. High volume users would
overcompensate the carrier while low volume users would
underpay.
Carriers should not bother to measure the distance between
call originator and call recipient if the cost of such metering
exceeds the cost differences in handling traffic of different
distances. Telephone companies, particularly long distance
carriers, typically average long and short haul traffic costs so that
they can offer a single, flat rate for all calls. Data communications,
including Internet-mediated services, have similar distance
insensitive cost characteristics.
Distance and traffic volume insensitivity means that
telecommunications and Internet service providers can offer a
single per minute or monthly rate for all calls within a wide
geographical area, e.g., the entire United States for long distance
telephone companies and the entire world for Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs"). Such a "postalized" rate averages whatever
cost differentials that still exist." Acknowledging the largely sunk
investment in telecommunications plant, some carriers now offer a
flat monthly rate for unlimited local and long distance calls. Such
"All You Can Eat" pricing 12 has become standard for Internet
access in the United States, and ISPs have never priced access
based on the distance separating users and the sources of content,
or between senders and recipients of electronic mail.
The death of distance largely erodes the rationale for using
geography or political boundaries as the basis for differences in
how carriers allocate costs and price services. Indeed many of the
11 For example, carriers typically still incur different, mileage-based carriers
when they lease a dedicated line of varying distances. Local exchange carrier
line transport charges are mileage-based when a single carrier leases a line
instead of sharing it with other carriers.
12 ISPs initially offered unlimited Internet access to stimulate demand and
considered unused network capacity as available for loading at little if any
additional cost. Such promotional pricing does not burden heavy users with
higher charges even though such rates could help ISPs recover fixed costs.
Absent congestion ISPs could consider the incremental cost of handling more
traffic as near zero.
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reasons for such differences never had a justification on the basis
of cost as opposed to other political, social or public policy factors:
[E]fficiency has not been the only goal of
intercarrier compensation rules. For example, in
order to encourage universal services, . .. [the
Federal Communications] Commission and state
regulators historically set access charges [paid to
local exchange carriers] above cost. By doing so,
they hoped to be able to keep local telephone rates
low, and thus telephone penetration rates high.
13
Federal and state telecommunications regulators previously
saddled long distance callers, especially ones making intrastate
calls, with higher rates than local telephone service consumers.
Over-priced long distance call revenues made it possible for local
exchange telephone companies ("LECs") to offer possibly below
cost local services and to tap into subsidies for achieving universal
service objectives including intentionally below cost service to
rural residents, the poor and residents of tribal lands.
1 4
13 Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9623.
14 "The Universal Service Fund now encompasses four programs that support
telecommunications services nationwide. These include: Low-Income, High-
Cost, Schools and Libraries, and Rural Health Care. Link-Up America (Link-
Up) and the Lifeline Assistance Program (Lifeline) are part of the Fund's Low-
Income Program." Federal Communications Commission, Get Connected:
Afford-A-Phone, Background, available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
getconnected/background.html (last modified Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Consumers qualifying for Link-Up America support are
eligible to save up to 50% on initial installation fees, not to
exceed $30 per household. In other words, up to $30 of the
first $60 of their initial hook-up bill. Participants may also
work with their telephone company to establish a deferred
payment schedule for remaining costs of up to $200.
Consumers living on American Indian or Alaskan Native
tribal lands may also qualify for an additional $70 to defray
initial connection charges.
The Lifeline Assistance Program enables eligible low-income
consumers to save from at least $6.75 to $9.50 on their basic
monthly telephone service fee depending on the state where
the consumer lives. Residents of tribal lands may be eligible
Distance insensitivity in telecommunications also
eliminates the rationale for having different charges for accessing
the same local exchange facilities on the basis of whether the call
crosses domestic or international borders, originates via a wireless
or wireline carrier, or traverses the Internet. Yet LECs continue
charging different rates largely because regulatory policies force
them to do so, or political factors favor their decision to over- or
under-price a particular service.
Set out below is a continuum of LEC access costs from
lowest to highest:
* the exchange of traffic between an ISP and a LEC typically
triggers no per minute access charge, because the ISP
qualifies as an information service provider exempt from
LEC access charge payment obligations making it possible
for the ISP to receive and terminate calls via metered
business telephone lines;
15
• the exchange of traffic between LECs occurs on a
reciprocal basis using zero cost, (bill and keep);' 6
for an additional $25 in savings on their basic monthly phone
bill.
Id.
15 "Since 1983, the Commission has consistently and consciously permitted
enhanced service providers, a category that now includes Internet service
providers (ISPs) to connect to their customers using local business lines."
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 3690 n.1 (1999); see also MTS and WATS
Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 715 (1983) (describing how the
implementation of high carrier rates would experience severe rate impacts).
"Enhanced service providers use interstate access but pay local business
exchange service rates." Implementation of the Local Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3690 n. 1.
16 Bill and Keep, sometimes referred to as Sender Keep All refers to an
interconnection arrangement where a carrier agrees to accept traffic from
another carrier in exchange for a reciprocal agreement. The carriers make no
financial payments to each other. "The sharing of traffic over the interconnected
networks forming the Internet on a statistical and un-metered 'settlements' (or
'bill & keep') basis was a hallmark of early federal agency involvement in the
development of the Intemet. This system of traffic carriage free of charge
became known as 'peering."' BARBARA ESBIN, INTERNET OVER CABLE:
DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF THE PAST 20 (F.C.C., O.P.P. Working
Paper No. 30, 1998), available at 1998 WL 567433.
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negotiated, or regulatory-agency prescribed rates typically
at a rate several decimal places below one cent;
17
the exchange of traffic between long distance, i.e.,
interexchange carriers ("IXCs") and LECs occurs on a
uniformly tarriffed basis with rates that have declined
substantially, but still significantly exceed the reciprocal
rates paid by LECs; 18 New Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers ("CLECs") typically charge IXCs higher access
fees than Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"); 19
17 Section 251 (b)(5) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires all local
exchange carriers "the duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements
for the transport and termination of telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251 (b)(5)
(2001). For examples of the quite small rates ILECs charge for local facilities,
see National Regulatory Research Institute, A Survey of Unbundled Network
Element Prices in the United States (July 2003), at http://nrri.org/documents/
Matrix0703all.pdf (comparing loop and port rates as well as tandem switching
and transport rates for state access lines) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology); Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak, Exporting
Telecommunications Regulation: The United States-Japan Negotiations on
Interconnection Pricing, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 317, 340 (2002) (listing the local
interconnection rates for selected states in 1999).
18 In 2000, the FCC adopted an industry proposed access charge regime that
increased user fees but reduced interexchange carrier access charge payments to
ILECs to a target range of 0.55 cents for the Regional Bell Operating
Companies and GTE, 0.65 cents for other LECs subject to price cap regulation,
and 0.95 cents LECs operating in areas with low subscriber densities. For
example, the Commission approved lower switching and transport access
services to a target range of 0.62. "We also adopt target rates of 0.55 cents for
the BOC price cap LECs and GTE, 0.95 cents for very low-density price cap
LECs, and 0.65 cents for other price cap LECs." See Matter of Access Charge
Reform, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 13,029 162 (2000), rev'd in part by Texas Office
of Public Utility Counsel v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 265 F.3d 313 (5th
Cir. 2001) (No. 00-60434), cert. denied by Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer
Advocates v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 535 U.S. 986 (2002), on remand
to Cost Review Proceeding for Residential and Single-Line Business Subscriber
Line Charge (SLC) Caps, 17 F.C.C.R. 10,868 (F.C.C. Jun. 5, 2002), available at
2002 WL 1213038.
19 "Our review of the record reveals that CLEC access rates vary quite
dramatically and, on the average, are well above the rates that ILECs charge for
similar service." Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed
by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, 2001 WL 431685, 22 (F.C.C. Apr.
7, 2001); see also Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962, 13,028 (2000) (describing how
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the exchange of traffic between a wireless carrier and a
wireline LEC carrier depends on whether the call appears
to be a local exchange of traffic (even if originated at a long
distance), or one involving a conventional long distance
call making the range variable;
20
the exchange of international long distance traffic on routes
lacking significant competition occurs on a per minute
accounting rate,21 ranging from a few cents to more than
the commission's current price cap plan allows price cap LECs flexibility to
determine tandem-switch rates), partially reversed sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub.
Util. Counsel v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002), on remand, Cost Review Proceeding for
Residential and Single-Line Business Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) Caps, 17
F.C.C.R. 10,868 (2002).
20 For example, in 2001 Sprint PCS charged AT&T 2.8 cents per minute to
deliver AT&T long distance calls to Sprint PCS subscribers. Petitions of Sprint
PCS and AT&T Corp. For Declaratory Ruling Regarding CMRS Access
Charges, WT Docket No. 01-316, Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 13,192
(2001). This rate matched what major wireline LECs charged interexchange
carriers, but ran counter to the traditional access pricing mechanism for wireless
carriers where subscribers of the wireless carrier compensate it for the cost of
both sending and receiving calls:
CMRS carriers have never operated under the same calling
party's network pays (CPNP) compensation regime as wireline
LECs. Under a CPNP regime, LECs are compensated for
terminating calls by the carrier of the customer that originates
the call, not by the customer receiving the call. In contrast,
since the advent of commercial wireless service, and
continuing today, CMRS carriers have charged their end users
both to make and to receive calls. Until 1998, when Sprint
PCS first approached AT&T and other IXCs about payment
for terminating access service, all CMRS carriers recovered
the cost of terminating long distance calls from their end users,
and not from interexchange carriers.... The fact that the
industry practice for 15 years has been for CMRS carriers to
recover costs from their end users, together with the highly
competitive nature of the interexchange market, makes it
unlikely that an IXC that does not pay access charges to
CMRS carriers somehow "overcharges" its customers.
Id. at 13,198.
2 1 For background on the international long distance telephone toll revenue
division process see ROB FRIEDEN, MANAGING INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ch. 9.1 (2001); Robert M. Frieden,
one dollar which covers long haul and local carriage;
22
even for routes where an accounting rate settlement does
not occur, the rates for call delivery widely varies; and
the exchange of international long distance traffic with a
foreign wireless operator may trigger a termination charge
exceeding fifty cents just for using the networks of both the
wireline LEC and a wireless carrier.
23
Arguably the costs incurred by LECs do not vary
significantly when their networks originate or terminate traffic that
traverses the same facilities. Yet even if the traffic types above
were to travel the same facilities-and they typically do-the
access charges imposed vary substantially. Such cost differentials
have little, if any, basis in rational cost allocation and recoupment,
but occur as a result of cost attribution: the purposeful loading or
unloading of costs onto functionally the same traffic switching and
routing functions based on political, social and public policy
rationales.24
Falling Through the Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU
and WTO, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 963, 963-75 (1998) (describing how
heightened attention to international calling rates at the ITU and WTO has led
some observers to conclude that carriers soon will impose cost-based
termination charges).
22 See Federal Communications Commission, IMTS Accounting Rates of the
United States 1985-2003 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/
pf/artsweb.xls (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
23 If the U.S.-outbound call is terminating on the network of a
mobile provider in the foreign country, there is an additional
termination charge passed back through to the U.S. carrier,
under "calling party pays," when the call is handed-off to the
foreign mobile provider for termination. U.S. providers
generally recoup these mobile termination costs from U.S.
consumers through rate surcharges. Examples of the highest
current per minute mobile surcharges [above the international
long distance charge] include: $0.28 for France; $0.22 for
Haiti; $0.32 for Panama; $0.22 for the United Kingdom; and
$0.33 for Uruguay.
International Settlements Policy Reform International Settlement Rates, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 19,954, 19,979 (2002).
24 For example, before the FCC sought more scientific and accurate cost
allocations between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions it used a "gross
allocator" to split local exchange carrier plant investment between the interstate
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5236
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The FCC has acknowledged inconsistency in the rates
LECs charge:
Interconnection arrangements between carriers are
currently governed by a complex system of
intercarrier compensation regulations. These
regulations treat different types of carriers and
different types of services disparately, even though
there may be no significant differences in the costs
among carriers of services. The [existing]
interconnection regime that applies in a particular
case depends on such factors as: whether the
interconnecting party is a local carrier, an
interexchange carrier, a [Commercial Mobile Radio
Service] carrier or an enhanced service provider;
and whether the service is classified as local or long
distance, interstate or intrastate, or basic or
enhanced.25
It may have made sense, on political or social equity
grounds, to load up costs onto wealthy long distance and wireless
callers when such services were luxuries enjoyed mostly by elites.
But now a far larger set of users incur higher charges, or qualify
for subsidized rates. Cost attribution provides a quasi-scientific
basis for targeting subsidies, but its calibration has limits resulting
in overinclusive and underinclusive groups of subsidy payers and
26recipients. As a result, subsidies flow unnecessarily to some
jurisdiction and intrastate jurisdiction. "[T]he gross allocator, [is] a factor that
allocates subscriber plant costs between the intrastate and interstate jurisdictions,
75 percent and 25 percent, respectively." Jurisdictional Separations Reform and
Referral to the Federal-State Joint Board, 15 F.C.C.R. 13,160, 13,168 n.40
(2000).
25 Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9613.
26 For example, universal service subsidies to any local exchange carrier
operating in a high cost, typically rural area, benefits all subscribers of that
carrier regardless of their individual financial status. "[A]ny policy that attempts
to increase subscribership levels by reducing the price of customer access is
likely to have only limited success, particularly if the program does not target
specific beneficiaries." David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies
in Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone
Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 140 (1994).
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beneficiaries with ample financial resources to pay the full costs,
and also burden some individuals who should not have to subsidize
the unwarranted beneficiaries. To its credit, the FCC has
expressed reservations whether its cost allocation policies can
jointly serve economic efficiency goals and public policy
27objectives.
Cost attribution also creates subsidy beneficiaries and
payers among carriers. 28 If the subsidy obligation is substantial,
27 With the passage of the [Telecommunications] Act [of] 1996,
and its mandate for opening all telecommunications markets to
competition, it is no longer clear that intercarrier
compensation rules can serve all of these multiple goals. For
example, Congress, in passing the 1996 Act, recognized that
the implicit subsidies historically contained in access charges
are not sustainable in competitive local telecommunications
markets. Accordingly, Congress in the 1996 Act directed this
Commission and the states to reform universal service, and in
particular, to eliminate implicit subsidies contained in access
charges and instead make all universal service support
explicit.
Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9623.
28 Interstate access charges are imposed by local exchange
carriers (LECs) to recover the costs of providing access to
their networks for interstate and long-distance service. The
Commission has long recognized that, to the extent possible,
interstate access costs should be recovered in the manner in
which they are incurred. In particular, non-traffic-sensitive
costs-costs that do not vary with the amount of traffic carried
over the facilities-should be recovered through flat-rate
charges, and traffic-sensitive costs should be recovered
through per-minute charges. This approach fosters
competition and efficient pricing. The Part 69 rules governing
access charges, however, have not been fully consistent with
this goal. For example, the costs of the common line or loop
that connects an end user to a LEC's central office should be
recovered from the end user through a flat charge, because
loop costs do not vary with usage. Yet the subscriber line
charge (SLC), a flat monthly charge assessed directly on end
users to recover interstate loop costs, has been capped since its
inception due to affordability concerns. Historically, LECs
recovered their remaining common line costs through per-
minute carrier common line (CCL) charges imposed on
interexchange carriers (IXCs) which, in turn, passed these
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the paying carrier becomes saddled with a financial burden that can
adversely affect its ability to offer competitive rates, upgrade
facilities, secure debt financing and attract investors. Beneficiaries
of subsidies may have bolstered opportunities to offer lower rates,
but they might just as easily capture the benefits without flowing
them to consumers and without making necessary plant
investments. Absent compelling reasons, regulatory agencies
should not create policies that competitively support or handicap
carriers.
II. Cost Attribution Creates Regulatory Arbitrage
Opportunities and Incumbents Retaliate
When telecommunication service providers incur different
local exchange access charges for the same usage, the competitive
playing field tilts to their advantage or disadvantage. Rather than
acquire market share and profits based on superior performance,
carriers can secure a competitive advantage simply by qualifying
for lower cost access even as competitors offering functionally the
same service have to pay more. The cost of access as shaped by
regulatory policy becomes a vehicle for arbitrage: the ability to
exploit differences in a cost of doing business to secure a
competitive advantage.
When regulatory arbitrage distorts the competitive
marketplace, disadvantaged stakeholders retaliate. Regulatory
gridlock and endless litigation result when stakeholders with ample
financial resources object to real or perceived handicaps. 29 Worse
charges on to their customers in the form of higher long
distance rates. By making the end-user rate for long distance
calls more expensive, CCL charges artificially suppressed
demand for interstate long distance services. CCL charges
also created significant implicit subsidies flowing from high-
volume to low-volume users of interstate long distance
services, which have a disruptive effect on competition in the
markets for local exchange and exchange access services.
Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for LECs, 2003 WL
21544089, at * 14977-78 (F.C.C. Jul. 10, 2003).29 See, e.g., Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3712 (1999), on remand,
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yet, these burdened stakeholders begin to think they should not
continue complying with longstanding, fundamental
responsibilities established by law, in light of their perception that
the regulatory process has confiscated resources by forcing them to
make facilities available to competitors at rates below cost.
For example, the Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs"), BellSouth, Qwest, SBC and Verizon, have vigorously
objected 30 to regulatory burdens imposed by the
Telecommunications Act of 199631 ("'96 Act") which targets them
for particularly extensive facilities access and interconnection
responsibilities. The '96 Act requires the RBOCs to interconnect
with competitors and to lease them portions of the RBOCs'
networks at rates well below what the RBOCs would like to
charge. Because state and federal regulators have intervened in
setting the price of such access, the rates fall well below what the
RBOCs would demand in arm's length negotiations or as would
occur in a deregulated, market-driven environment. Accordingly,
the RBOCs claim32 that the rates they have to charge are below
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 290 F.3d 415, 422-28
(D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 940 (2003); Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R.
16,978 (2003), errata, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003), partially rev'd and rem 'd,
United States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, No. 00-10 12,
slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 2004).
30 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996), aff'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997); Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
Fed. Communications Comm'n, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and
remanded, AT & T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), on remand Iowa
Utils. Bd. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000) (Iowa
Utils. II), rev'd in part sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
31 Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. §§ 251-710 (2001).32 See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 981
F. Supp. 996, 1006-08 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (agreeing with an ILEC that
provisions in the '96 Act constituted "punishment" and, thus, provisions resulted
in an unconstitutional "bill of attainder."), rev'd, 54 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1113 (1999); see also BellSouth Corp. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678, 691-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding
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cost, confiscatory and an unconstitutional taking of their
property.33 The RBOCs also claim that the '96 Act requirements
so create subsidies for CLECs that the RBOCs have little incentive
to invest in facility upgrades.
34
Despite the Supreme Court's determination that the RBOCs
failed to prove any prescribed rate as uncompensatory, 35 these
specific regulatory requirements imposed on the Regional Bell Operating
Companies did not violate Constitutionally granted equal protection, because
they are not a protected class and government had a rational basis for singling
them out for special requirements).
33 The academic literature has split on the issue of whether a taking has
occurred. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and
Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 933-37 (1996)
(arguing that a taking has occurred); cf David Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum,
Who's Taking Whom: Some Comments and Evidence on the Constitutionality of
TELRIC, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 239, 252-54 (2000) (arguing that a taking has not
occurred); E. Sanderson Hoe & Stephen Ruscus, Taking Aim at the Takings
Argument: Using Forward-Looking Pricing Methodologies to Price Unbundled
Network Elements, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 231, 240 (1997) (arguing that a
taking has not occurred).
34 If the incumbent LEC, the putative owner of the local
network, no longer can recover the costs of investments that it
would make on a forward-looking basis-let alone keep any
economic rents accruing to such investments-then entrants
become free riders and the incumbent LEC's incentive to
make further investment in the local exchange network
evaporates.
J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1161 (1997).
"[M]andatory unbundling confers a second-mover advantage and substantially
decreases a CLEC's incentives to make a sunk investment." Thomas M. Jorde
et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 21
(2000).
35 At the outset, it is well to understand that the incumbent
carriers do not present the portent of a constitutional taking
claim in the way that is usual in ratemaking cases. They do
not argue that any particular, actual TELRIC rate is "so unjust
as to be confiscatory," that is, as threatening an incumbent's
"financial integrity."
Verizon Communications v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 535 U.S. 467,
523-24 (2002) (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307, 312
(1989)). "Indeed, the incumbent carriers have not even presented us with an
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carriers persist in arguing that state regulatory agencies and the
FCC have unfairly tilted the competitive playing field against
them. The RBOCs' claim of unfairness has credibility not because
the prescribed access rates will result in their financial ruination,
but more generally because the RBOCs have had to comply with
common carrier network access duties even as some competitors
36have managed to evade such requirements. For example, the
RBOCs face common carrier regulation as telecommunications
instance of TELRIC rates, which are to be set or approved by state commissions
and reviewed in the first instance in the federal district courts." Id. at 524 (citing
47 U.S.C. §§ 252(e)(4)-(6)). The Supreme Court did not appear to consider the
takings argument as legitimate in view of failure of the ILECs "to present any
evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC was arbitrary, opportunistic, or
undertaken with a confiscatory purpose." Id. at 527-28.
36 The RBOCs and others assert claim that the '96 Act RBOC requirements
makes it easier and cheaper for CLECs to lease and resell RBOC facilities rather
than build their own. "[T]he TELRIC methodology in effect grants a 'free
option' to new entrants, since it ignores the fact that there are significant sunk
costs in telecommunications infrastructure. In other words, it will always be
cheaper for CLECs to lease than to invest." Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle
in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act to Blame?, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 28 (2003); see also Jorde et al., supra note 34; cf Robert B. Ekelund,
Jr. & George S. Ford, Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling: An Empirical
Update, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 383 (2003); Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak,
Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing
Increase Risk For Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?, 20 YALE J. ON REG.
389 (2003). The RBOCs claim ignores the fact that an extraordinarily high
amount of investment, estimated at over $267 billion, flowed into the
telecommunications sectors in the five years spanning enactment of the '96 Act
and the substantial downturn in that began in 2001. Phoenix Center for
Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, The Truth About
Telecommunications Investment, available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/policybulletin/policybulletin4final.pdf (Jun. 24, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The Supreme Court flatly
rejected the ILEC argument that ILECs had made no significant investment in
facilities. The Court found that CLECs had invested $55 billion from 1996-
2000 and concluded that "a regulatory scheme that can boast such substantial
competitive capital spending over a four-year period is not easily described as an
unreasonable way to promote competitive investment." Verizon, 535 U.S. at
517. The FCC reported that a CLEC trade association estimates the investment
figure at $71 billion. Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing
of Unbundled Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, 2003 WL 22119504, at *18,947 n.4 (F.C.C. Sept. 15, 2003).
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service providers while ISPs avoid such classification even when
providing Intemet-delivered long distance telephone service.37
The RBOCs' view of an unfair regulatory climate grows
more strident in view of the numerous other accommodations they
38have had to make under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
RBOCs have had to unbundle their networks and offer access to
local exchange competitors on an ala carte basis. 39 This customary
common carrier responsibility would have been more palatable to
the RBOCs had a quid pro quo established in the '96 Act
successfully balanced their costs and benefits. The '96 Act offered
RBOCs a new profit center, long distance telephone service
40
across Local Access and Transport Areas,4' in exchange for timely
37 Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501 (1998); see
also Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272
of the Comms. Act of 1934, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,905 (1996); Robert M. Frieden,
Dialing for Dollars: Will the FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47 (1997).
38 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (2001).
39 All LECs have the
duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier
for the provision of a telecommunications service,
nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the agreement and the requirements of this section and
section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange carrier
shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner
that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in
order to provide such telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).40 Id. § 271.
41 As part of the divestiture of AT&T's local exchange carriers in 1984, the
spun-off Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") faced restrictions on
the lines of businesses they could operate, including long distance telephone
service that crossed specific geographical boundaries. Local Access and
Transport Areas identified the geographical region within which the RBOCs
could provide local and limited toll services. Section 271 of the '96 Act
authorized RBOC entry into inter-LATA service after an RBOC satisfied a
competitive checklist, on a state by state basis, designed to promote fair
competition and access to RBOC facilities. The definition of LATA contained
in the '96 Act is:
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compliance with a variety of competitor accommodations. The '96
Act conditioned the long distance telephone service opportunity
with an RBOC proving that it had complied with a fourteen point
competitive checklist ostensibly providing an unimpaired and fair
opportunity for local exchange service competition to develop.
42
a contiguous geographic area-
(A) established before February 8, 1996, by a Bell operating
company such that no exchange area includes points within
more than 1 metropolitan statistical area, consolidated
metropolitan statistical area, or State, except as expressly
permitted under the AT&T Consent Decree; or
(B) established or modified by a Bell operating company after
February 8, 1996, and approved by the Commission.
Id. § 153(25).
42 The fourteen point competitive checklist requires the Bell Operating
Companies to: (1) have finalized at least one interconnection agreement with a
competitor or a time period has passed without such an interconnection request;
(2) the provision of full and fair interconnection with competitive local
exchange carriers in accordance with the requirements of sections 251 (c)(2) and
252(d)(1); (3) nondiscriminatory and "A la carte" access to network elements in
accordance with the requirements of sections 251 (c)(3) and 252(d)(1); (4)
nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned
or controlled by the Bell Operating Company at just and reasonable rates in
accordance with the requirements of section 224; (5) local loop transmission
from the central office to a customer's premises, unbundled from local switching
or other services; (6) local transport from the trunk side of a wire line local
exchange carrier's switch unbundled from switching or other services; (7) local
switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services;
(8) nondiscriminatory access to 911 emergency services, directory assistance
services to allow the other carriers' customers to obtain telephone numbers and
operator call completion services; (9) white pages directory listings for
customers of other carriers' telephone exchange services; (10) nondiscriminatory
access to telephone numbers for assignment to the other carriers' telephone
exchange service customers, nondiscriminatory access to databases and
associated signaling necessary for call routing and completion; (11)
nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for
call routing and completion; (12) number portability, i.e., the ability of a former
BOC customer to retain use of a preexisting telephone number after having
subscribed to telephone service from another carrier; (13) nondiscriminatory
access to such services or information as are necessary to allow requesting
carriers to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of
section 251 (b)(3), i.e., the same number of digits dialed for either BOC or
alternative service; and (14) reciprocal compensation. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
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While all of the access and interconnection requirements fit within
the set of reasonable common carrier responsibilities the FCC and
state regulatory agencies could impose, the '96 Act induced timely
compliance by offering what initially looked like a robust future
market opportunity. Unfortunately, the attractiveness of the carrot
to RBOC networks to CLECs dimmed as long distance telephone
service became a low margin, commodity business.
43
A. Regulatory Arbitrage Thwarts Deregulatory
Initiatives
When regulatory arbitrage opportunities exist, stakeholders
perceive advantages accruing from efforts to game the system,
litigate and delay initiatives that might eventually lead to less
regulation and near parity of regulatory status among competitors.
Stakeholders' concerns about short-term profitability may obscure
the prospects in the long term for a level competitive playing field.
Until then, stakeholders may prefer to compete in the courtroom, at
the legislature and with pleadings before state public utility
commissions and the FCC instead of in the marketplace.
Regulatory arbitrage in telecommunications has created
readily identifiable gaming strategies among stakeholders to:
• qualify services as interstate instead of intrastate;
" obscure the origin of traffic with an eye toward making
international traffic appear domestic and long distance
traffic appear local;
" characterize traffic as local instead of long haul if doing so
classifies the traffic as generating a reciprocal payment
obligation instead of an access charge payment;
* distort or obscure the origin of traffic and method of
transmission to reduce or avoid charges imposed by another
carrier to deliver the traffic to the intended recipient;
43 Rob Frieden, Fear and Loathing in Information and Telecommunications
Industries: Reasons for and Solutions to the Current Financial Meltdown and
Regulatory Quagmire, 5 INT'L J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 1, 25-38 (2003) (explaining
that massive reductions in the per unit cost of providing long distance service
reduces profit margins).
" route traffic via the Internet; and
* offer telecommunications services as ancillary to, or a
minor transport element for an enhanced information
service.
Regardless of whether they legally or illegally exploit
regulatory loopholes, arbitrage strategies cause marketplace
distortions and reduce the effectiveness of market countervailing
regulatory policies based on public interest predicates. If it were
not for the failure of legislatures and regulatory agencies to make
necessary adjustments on a timely basis, one might consider the
unjust enrichment such tactics accrue as perhaps a necessary short-
term byproduct of regulatory reform. But when regulatory
adjustments do not quickly occur, stakeholders can accrue
substantial financial gains simply by exploiting regulatory
loopholes while others unfairly suffer. Masters in gaming
strategies include CLEC affiliates of ISPs who receive dial-up
modem traffic that first enters the public switched telephone
network ("PSTN") of an ILEC, but is handed off from the ILEC to
the CLEC thereby qualifying the CLEC for compensation from the
ILEC who typically receives no offsetting traffic in return.45 Other
gaming masters include stakeholders who reduce payments owed
to other carriers by avoiding traffic delivery responsibilities,46 by
44Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9632.
45 Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 9153 (2001), remanded on procedural grounds,
WorldCom, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (without vacating the FCC's order requiring a transition to bill and keep
compensation between ILECs and ISPs, the court held that the FCC could not
replace existing intercarrier compensation arrangements by carving out calls
made to ISPs via ILEC phone lines from the reciprocal compensation
requirement established in Section 251 (b)(5) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996), cert. denied, Core Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 123 S. Ct. 1927 (2003).
46 For example an ISP might avoid facilities construction or line leasing costs by
handing off traffic to another ISP who would then bear the burden of securing
final delivery or at least carriage onward to the intended destination. This free
riding tactic is referred to as "hot potato routing": "Rather than lease lines
throughout the nation and expand capacity, the free rider ISP may attempt to
hand off traffic to a larger, better equipped ISP at the closest public peering
point. The free rider ISP considers traffic a 'hot potato' and has a financial
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SPRING 2004] REGULATORY ARBITRAGE STRATEGIES 247
obscuring or distorting the origination point of traffic4 7 and by
characterizing traffic as exempt from payment responsibilities to
another carrier.
48
B. Examples of Regulatory Arbitrage
1. Grey Market Strategies
Not all regulatory arbitrage strategies violate laws and
regulations even though they deviate from regulatory intent, or
exploit loopholes. Arguably, when a customer or a carrier exploits
an arbitrage opportunity, carriers have greater incentives to close
the loophole and correct inconsistent charges and policies. The
sticky resilience of some loopholes indicates that carriers
themselves might also gain, even as they claim unjust enrichment
by others. Accordingly, when carriers create arbitrage
opportunities absent a regulatory obligation one should closely
examine why the loophole persists. Carriers might tolerate lost
traffic and revenues if they accrue even greater benefits including
regulatory relief, insulation from having to compete, and
opportunities to price discriminate profitably, because most
incentive to pass such traffic off to any other ISP who agrees to take it." Rob
Frieden, Without Public Peer: the Potential Regulatory and Universal Service
Consequences ofInternet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 2 n.2 (1998);
see also Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet
Backbones, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 45, 60 (2003).
47 For example if a carrier charges higher fees to deliver international traffic and
domestic traffic, a foreign carrier seeking termination of traffic will attempt to
interconnect with the terminating carrier in a manner that makes the traffic
appear domestic or even local in origin. The term refiling refers to the physical
reinsertion of distant traffic into a local or additional long distance network to
reduce fees borne by the sender.
48 For example if two carriers agree to a zero cost "bill and keep"
interconnection arrangement all traffic handed off from one carrier to the other
triggers no payment obligation. Carriers agree to this arrangement when they
have roughly equal traffic volumes. However, the zero cost arrangement may
encourage carriers to collect traffic from diverse locations, where an
interconnection payment would be required, and route it to the carrier offering
zero cost interconnection.
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carriers and consumers cannot avoid paying higher rates ostensibly
to offset regulatory arbitrage losses.
Grey market regulatory arbitrage refers primarily to "self-
help" strategies available to consumers that reduce
telecommunications charges. Consumers can execute some of
these tactics unilaterally, but most require the involvement of an
enterprising business venture. Most grey market regulatory
arbitrage strategies allow consumers to save money by physically
linking two previously separate lines, or by changing the apparent
origination point of a call. Masking the true origination point of a
call can lower costs by converting long distance calls into local
calls and by applying lower rates than otherwise would apply.
i. Leaky PBXs
A longstanding regulatory arbitrage opportunity for
business customers involves the use of an on-premises
switchboard, commonly referred to as a Private Branch Exchange
("PBX") that can link long distance lines with outbound local
telephone lines. Even businesses with only a few telephone lines
can use a PBX to "leak" traffic into the local exchange, including
calls originating at a long distance via an inter-city private line.49
For example, a law firm with offices in Washington, D.C.
and New York City might lease a private line to provide a direct
link between telephones situated in either office. Carriers typically
offer private lines based on the assumption that users need an
intercom link between offices and nowhere else. With the
proliferation of PBXs, businesses could easily engineer local
exchange access at both ends of the private line without having to
make additional payments to either the long distance or local
exchange carriers handling the traffic. The PBX links regular local
business lines in both cities with the inter-city, private line. While
such leaky PBXs might technically violate carrier service terms
49 A "long-recognized form of regulatory arbitrage is the ability of certain
owners of private branch exchanges ('PBXs') to avoid paying access charges on
long-distance calls (the 'leaky PBX' problem)." Bill and Keep Carrier
Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9616.
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and conditions, few carriers decided to enforce them, even when a
tariff5° was filed with and approved by the FCC. 51
ii. Resale of Private and WATS Lines
Entrepreneurial new telecommunications ventures, often
operating with limited seed money, can market themselves as
national long distance telephone companies through the resale of
private lines and wide area telephone service calling, i.e., outbound
long distance calling via a 1 plus 800, 877, or 866 prefix. Resale
so For over six decades a tariff regime was mandated by the
Communications Act of 1934, which requires the FCC to
review telecommunications carriers' tariffs to ensure their
reasonableness [citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-02]. The Act
requires carriers to file their tariffs with the FCC, [citing 47
U.S.C. § 203(a)], and they are prohibited from charging
consumers except as provided in the tariffs [citing 47 U.S.C. §
203(c)] (establishing what is popularly known as the 'filed-
rate doctrine').
MCI WorldCom Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 209 F.3d 760, 762
(D.C. Cir. 2000). Starting in the early 1980s, the Commission tried to prohibit
tariff-filing by all IXCs but AT&T. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (mandatory
detariffing deemed inconsistent with the 1934 Act). These efforts failed, until
Congress expressly authorized elimination of regulatory requirement based on
changed circumstance and a public interest justification. See Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2003) (as amended).
51 The "leaky PBX" problem arises where large end users that
employ multiple PBXs in multiple locations lease private lines
to connect their various PBXs. Although these lines were
intended to permit employees of the large users to
communicate between locations without incurring access
charges, some large users permitted long-distance calls to leak
from the PBX into the local public network where they were
terminated without incurring access charges. In order to
address this problem, the Commission in 1983 imposed a $25
per month charge on each trunk that could "leak" traffic into
the public switched network.
Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9616 n.21 (citing
47 C.F.R. § 69.115); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97
F.C.C.2d 834 (1984).
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provided the first major competitive domestic service options in
the United States in the 1970s. 52 The FCC supported linkage of
private lines with local exchange access in part because it forced
long distance carriers to reduce rates and narrow or eliminate the
financial arbitrage opportunity created by the big gap between
retail long distance rates and the far lower per minute costs borne
by large volume users:
We find that elimination of the restrictions on
unlimited resale and sharing of private line service
will bring about public benefits which include:
(a) the provision of communications service
at rates more closely related to costs;
(b) better management of communications
networks and the provision of management
expertise by users and intermediaries to the
carriers;
(c) the avoidance of waste of
communications capacity; and,
(d) the creation of additional incentives for
research and development of ancillary
devices to be used with transmission lines.53
Private line resale also has provided the first significant
downward pressure and competitive option for international calls
in many nations.54 Consumers need not await the onset of
52 [A]fter an investigation, AT&T was ordered by the FCC to
remove all resale restrictions in its tariffs for Message
Telephone Service (MTS). After the WATS resale went into
effect, many resellers began to take advantage of the new
opportunities. Through leasing WATS lines, both MCI and
Sprint were then able to connect their customers' calls to
anywhere in the AT&T network.
Richard E. Nohe, A Different Time, A Different Place: Breaking Up Telephone
Companies in the United States and Japan, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 307, 319
(1996).
53 Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 7 (1976).
54 Simple Resale, or ISR, it could introduce competitive forces
on routes that would place downward pressure on U.S.-
international settlement rates. ISR involves the provision of
switched services over resold or facilities-based private lines
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facilities-based competition to save money, but on the other hand
incumbents may experience competition from poorly capitalized
ventures with little incentive or ability to invest in new, in ground
facilities.
iii. International Call Reorigination
International call-back services provide regulatory arbitrage
opportunities resulting from the vastly different charges for
international long distance among nations.55 Call reorigination
enables callers in high cost nations to secure international long
distance service at much lower rates. Callers in high cost areas use
a service that triggers a request for dial tone in a low cost nation
making it appear as though the call originated in the low cost area
inbound to the high cost area. While some nations have deemed
call-back illegal, little can be done to block the importation of
outbound calling access from lower cost areas.
The FCC initially agreed, on international comity grounds,
56to enforce a foreign country's law prohibiting call-back services.
that connect to the public switched network at either end-
point. Instead of U.S. carriers paying for the use of half of a
shared circuit to a foreign point through traditional settlement
payments, U.S. carriers under ISR arrangements may connect
or lease a complete or whole circuit end-to-end to the
corresponding foreign carrier's network and pay a negotiated
rate for termination of services on the foreign network.
International Settlements Policy Reform International Settlement Rates, 17
F.C.C.R. 19,954, 19,961 (2002).
55 Call-back service allows a customer in a foreign country to
use foreign facilities to dial a telephone number in the United
States and receive dial tone at a switch at the reseller's U.S.
location, which the customer can then use to place a call via an
outbound switched service of a U.S. carrier. The through calls
are billed at U.S.-tariffed rates.
Via USA, Ltd. Telegroup, Inc., Discount Call Int'l Co., 9 F.C.C.R. 2288, 2288
(1994), on reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 9540 (1995).
56 "We therefore find, as a matter of international comity, that the Commission
should prohibit carriers authorized to provide call-back service utilizing
uncompleted call signaling from providing this offering in countries where it is
expressly prohibited. We would expect no less from foreign governments in a
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However, in early 200357 the Commission abandoned its
enforcement of other nations' call-back prohibitions on grounds
that international call reorigination benefits consumers by forcing
carriers throughout the world to reduce rates to cost plus a
reasonable profit. 58 Additionally, call-back has helped dismantle
an international toll revenue division system that has used
excessively high rates as the basis for interconnecting networks.59
Call-back and other routing strategies help disrupt a system
where carriers attempt to price discriminate to maximize profits,
comparable context." Via USA, Ltd. Telegroup, Inc. Discount Call Int'l Co., 10
F.C.C.R. at 9557.
57 See Enforcement of Other Nations' Prohibitions Against the Uncompleted
Call Signaling Configuration of International Call-Back Service, Petition for
Rulemaking of the Telecommunications Resellers Association To Eliminate
Comity-Based Enforcement of Other Nations' Prohibitions Against the
Uncompleted Call Signaling Configuration of International Call-back Service,
18 F.C.C.R. 6077, 6081-83 (2003).
58 By no longer enforcing prohibitions against call-back in
foreign countries, we are not rejecting the sovereign rights of
any foreign government or limiting the ability of a foreign
government to adopt and enforce policies to prohibit call-back
within its jurisdiction. Rather, we are re-emphasizing our
standing policy to encourage competition in all markets, both
developed and developing. We will continue to work in
various fora to promote network expansion and universal
access. We encourage a pro-competitive call-back policy that
extends to the international marketplace, embraces free and
open competition, and benefits U.S. consumers as well as the
global community by ensuring lower prices, new and better
products and services, and greater consumer choice. Indeed,
we believe that eliminating call-back prohibitions enhance
competition throughout the global marketplace.
Id. at 6081-82.
59 Carriers are adopting non-traditional, more cost-efficient
means of routing traffic, such as routing switched traffic over
private lines and switched hubbing. Some experts predict that
by 2005, the resale market will be worth ten times what it was
in 1996. New technologies such as callback and Internet
telephony are already putting significant pressure on
international settlement rates and domestic collection rates.
Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Market, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, 23,895 (1997), modified by, 13 F.C.C.R. 6219
(1998).
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regardless of cost support for the rate differentials. 6u However, the
disruption occurs when iconoclasts and entrepreneurs seek to
disrupt the system, with little regard for whether the tactics they
use comply with domestic and international law and whether they
trigger unintended adverse consequences, e.g., substantially
reduced hard currency payments from developed to developing
countries as a result of more outbound calls from the former to the
latter.
iv. Internet Telephony
An even more extensive regulatory arbitrage opportunity
results when newcomers and incumbents alike use the Internet to
route long distance telephone service traffic. Making the
conversion from dial-up, circuit switched telephony61 to packet
switched Internet62 qualifies the traffic for favorable regulatory
60 "We continue to believe that encouraging alternative means of routing traffic,
such as international call-back service, Internet telephony, and switched hubbing
is an effective way to lower settlement rates, as well as foreign and domestic
collection rates." 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reform of the
International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing Requirements and
Regulation of International Accounting Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
13 F.C.C.R. 15,320, 15,327 (1998). "New technologies such as call-back and
Internet telephony are already putting significant pressure on international
settlement rates and domestic collection rates." Rules and Policies on Foreign
Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market and Market Entry and
Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, 23,896 (1997), on
reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 18,158 (2000).
61 Conventional dial-up local and long distance telephone service use dedicated
links and line switching between caller and call recipient. The network
architecture optimizes quality and reliability for voice communications. For
background on telephony basics see Marshal Brain, How Telephones Work, at
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/telephone6.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
62 The Internet uses a network architecture that splits traffic into some units
known as packets. Packets are switched and routed via any available network
which provides a shared medium available to multiple senders and receivers of
data traffic. For background on Internet architecture basics see Jeff Tyson, How
Internet Infrastructure Works, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet-
infrastructure.htm htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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treatment including fee exemptions. Conventional long distance
telephone service obligates carriers to pay access charges to LECs
for using their networks to originate and terminate traffic, i.e.,
using the local loop facilities of LECs from call originator to the
Point of Presence ("POP") where the IXC receives calls for the
long haul carriage and for LEC delivery of calls received at the
POP and delivered to the call recipient. Instead of paying per
minute access charges, Internet telephony carriers need only
acquire inbound business telephone lines that their customers can
use to access their services. Alternatively, consumers of Internet
telephony can access ISP facilities via LEC-provided Digital
Subscriber Lines or cable television operator supplied links.
The Internet provides a medium for the instantaneous, "real
time" processing and delivery of packets corresponding to voice
63
conversations. While initial Internet telephony services had
inferior quality as compared to conventional dial-up long distance
telephone service, the gap has narrowed and Internet telephony
offers consumers ample cost savings,partly because of the
exemption from LEC access charges, 4 and the duty to make
contributions to universal service funding. Consistent with its
attempt to keep the Internet regulation-free, the FCC considers
software generated, non-commercial Internet telephony access via
broadband lines65 as an "enhanced service" under the Second
Computer Inquiry,66 and an "information service" 67 under the '96
63 For more extensive background on this topic see Frieden, supra note 37, at
47-79.
64 Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9657.
65 See Fed. Communications Comm'n, Petition for Declaratory Ruling that
pulver.com 's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications nor a
Telecommunications Service, WC Docket No. 04-35, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-04-27A 1 .pdf (Feb. 19,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
66 The Commission defines an enhanced services as "services offered over
common carrier transmission facilities, which employ computer processing
applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of
the subscriber's additional, different or restructured information; or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information." Amendment of Section 64.702
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 (1980), on
reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),further reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d
512 (1981), affd, Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. Fed.
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Act, and accordingly not a "telecommunications service"68 subject
to common carrier regulation. 69 However, in light of the variety of
Internet-mediated telephone services, the FCC acknowledged that
not all services might continue to qualify for exemption from
Communications Comm'n, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 938 (1983).
67 "The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2001).
68 "The term 'telecommunications service' means the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as
to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). The '96 Act defines telecommunications as "the
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).
69 While not using the basic/enhanced services dichotomy created by the FCC,
the '96 Act's telecommunications/information services dichotomy establishes
the same regulatory distinction: The term "information service" follows from a
distinction the Commission drew in the First, Second, and Third Computer
Inquiries ("Computer I," "Computer II," and "Computer III"). See generally
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (Computer I);
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Computer II); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Computer III
Phase I Order). That distinction was between basic data transmission service on
the one hand and, on the other, a combination of that transmission and
computer-mediated offerings. That combination produces "enhanced" or
information services. This distinction was incorporated into the Modification of
Final Judgment, which governed the BOCs after the bell system break-up, and
into the 1996 Act. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, 11,536, 75 (1998) (citing United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp.
525 (D.D.C. 1987), and 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988)), rev'd in part, 900 F.2d
283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet
over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3029 n.38 (2002).
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universal service funding obligations, even though the Commission
favors maintaining their largely unregulated status.
70
Technological innovations in Internet telephony work to
make the service closer to a functional equivalent to dial-up, long
distance telephone service. In particular, one now can access
Internet telephony services via an ordinary telephone handset, a far
more user friendly option than previously available via specially
configured personal computers. In a Report to Congress on
Universal Service, 71 the FCC tentatively concluded that phone-to-
phone Internet telephony appears to constitute a
"telecommunications service" under the '96 Act and
acknowledged that such a classification would trigger access
charge liability. However, the Commission refrained from using a
Congressional report as the forum for issuing a definitive ruling.
Mediation by the Internet qualifies Internet telephony
carriers for largely unregulated status as providers of enhanced,
information services, despite the fact that Internet telephony
competes with and constitutes a functional equivalent to
conventional dial-up telephony. By simply using the Internet as a
medium for carrying long distance telephone traffic part of the way
between call originator and call recipient, Internet telephony
providers qualify for the largely unregulated status as providers of
enhanced/information services. Internet telephony service
providers also avoid having to make contributions, from their
revenues or through customer surcharges.
v. CLEC and Wireless Carrier Call
Termination
Another type of arbitrage opportunity occurs when one
carrier can leverage access to its subscriber base to extract higher
access payments than what other carriers charge for functionally
the same sort of access. Some CLEC and cellular radio carriers
70 See Fed. Communications Comm'n, IP-Enabled Services, No. 04-36 (Mar. 10,
2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-
28A1 .pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
71 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,541
(1998).
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have charged higher rates for call terminations than their ILEC
counterparts, without having to prove that the CLECs' or wireless
carriers' call delivery functions costs substantially more than when
ILECs perform the same service. The differential in charges has
grown to such an acute level that the FCC has launched an
investigation of CLEC access charges72 and also the surcharges
IXCs impose to recoup payments made to foreign wireless carriers
for terminating international calls to their subscribers. 7
3
Il. Regulatory Dichotomies that Create Arbitrage
Opportunities
Many regulatory arbitrage opportunities in
telecommunications result from the creation of classifications that
trigger unequal financial and regulatory burdens. Such inequality
typically lacks any financial justification based on cost of service
differentials. In other words, an FCC decision to regulate or not
regulate a service category, or to impose comparatively greater or
lesser regulatory and financial burdens depends on political and
public policy rationales and not cost differentials. Some of the
rationales may have had reasonable policy justification at the time
the regulatory policy decision was first made. However, changes
in service cost, reduced financial and regulatory barriers to market
entry and technological innovations may have overturned
assumptions made to justify regulatory inequality. Set out below
are a number of ongoing regulatory dichotomies that remain in
force despite changed circumstances that erode much of the
justifications for unequal treatment.
A. Intrastate Service Charges Exceed Interstate Rates
From the onset of long distance telephone service to the
present, traffic that stays within a state typically costs consumers
72 Fed. Communications Comm'n, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, 2001 WL 431685 (2001).
73 International Settlements Policy Reform International Settlement Rates, 17
F.C.C.R. 19,954, 19,979 (2002).
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more than traffic that crosses a state boundary.74 No technological
reason justifies such a price differential, but legitimate public
policy goals may still exist.75 The difference lies in cost allocation
decisions made by state regulators that may deviate from the
FCC's national policies, or which lag in the transition to reformed
policies. For example, higher intrastate long distance charges
result from a decision by state regulators to load financial burdens
onto IXCs and their customers so that LECs and their customers
have a lighter load.
Regardless of the individual wealth or personal
circumstances, users making long distance telephone calls
historically have incurred higher charges on a per mile or per
minute basis than callers making interstate calls of equal duration
or distance. The FCC has acknowledged the inefficiency and
inequity in pricing policies and cost allocation decisions that create
implicit subsidies. 7 However, the FCC has not had complete
success in convincing state public utility commissions that
74 A major reason for the rate differential lies in the access charges paid by IXCs
to LECs. Many states still burden IXCs, and their customers, with implicit
subsidy obligations designed to keep local rates low.
While intrastate and interstate access are functionally similar
services, intrastate access rates are regulated by the state
commissions that have a wide range of services under their
jurisdiction. In some states, switched access rates are quite
low-comparable to the FCC's cost estimates. In most states,
however, the rates far exceed even the high levels of interstate
access charges ....
Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 17, at 341.
75 "State commissions, which have traditionally exercised jurisdiction over
intrastate telecommunications, have significantly closer proximity and more
intimate knowledge of... [local consumer needs] than does this Commission.
They have greater knowledge, for instance, of how their intrastate retail rates are
set, including where the implicit subsidies lie." Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, No. 01-338,
2003 WL 22175730, at 425 (2003).
76 For example, "implicit subsidies flowing from high-volume to low-volume
users of interstate long distance services ... have a disruptive effect on
competition in the markets for local exchange and exchange access services."
F.C.C., Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for LECs, 2003
WL 21544089, at 2 (2003).
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artificially loaded costs on one user group vis-d-vis others, harms
carriers and consumers alike.
The FCC's access charge reform orders have largely, but
not entirely, 77 removed excessive costs borne by long distance
callers via higher per minute charges and ordered the recoupment
of such costs directly from all telephone subscribers. Not all states
have implemented similar cost allocation reforms. Accordingly,
many long distance carriers continue to charge higher per minute
intrastate long distance charges.
B. Different Local Interconnection Charges Based on
Service Classification
Few would dispute that LECs incur similar, if not identical
costs, when using the same facilities to provide the first and last
link of traffic, regardless of where and how the traffic is routed
after the first link and before the last link. Yet local exchange
facility charges vary widely among states78 and as a function of
77 [T]he costs of the common line or loop that connects an end
user to a LEC's central office should be recovered from the
end user through a flat charge, because loop costs do not vary
with usage. Yet the subscriber line charge (SLC), a flat
monthly charge assessed directly on end users to recover
interstate loop costs, has been capped since its inception due to
affordability concerns. Historically, LECs recovered their
remaining common line costs through per-minute carmer
common line (CCL) charges~imposed on interexchange
carriers (IXCs) which, in turn, passed these charges on to their
customers in the form of higher long distance rates. By
making the end-user rate for long distance calls more
expensive, CCL charges artificially suppressed demand for
interstate long distance services. CCL charges also created
significant implicit subsidies flowing from high-volume to
low-volume users of interstate long distance services, which
have a disruptive effect on competition in the markets for local
exchange and exchange access services.
Id.
78 See National Regulatory Research Institute, A Survey of Unbundled Network
Element Prices in the United States, at http://nrri.org/documents/
Matrix07O3all.pdf (July 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).
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whether the LEC receives traffic from another LEC, an IXC, a
wireless carrier, or from an international carrier. In the regulated
environment in which LECs operate, such carriers presumably
have to price services based on their actual costs, or on an even
lower forward looking estimate of their costs based on assumptions
of what carriers using "best practices" and new technologies would
incur.79 Only where competition justifies streamlined or
eliminated regulation may carriers charge what the market will
bear. However, the fact that local exchange access pricing differ
by state and by service attests to the ability of ILECs to
differentiate functionally equivalent services based on other factors
including demand elasticities, whether alternative carriage options
exist, and what user groups state regulators want to favor.
For example, wireline LECs initially charged wireless
carriers a significant premium over rates charged to other wireline
LECs. Before wireless carriers' traffic reached a critical mass
LECs could dictate the location where interconnection would take
place and could demand compensation for terminating calls
originating on a wireless network even as wireless carriers could
not secure reciprocal compensation for terminating calls
originating on a LEC's wireline network.
79 Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes interconnection
duties on carriers providing telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 251
(2001). The FCC and state public utility commissions bear the responsibility for
calculating the cost of interconnection when the carriers themselves cannot
reach a negotiated agreement. In implementing this section of the '96 Act, the
FCC adopted a Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") cost
methodology. This method for calculating costs ignores the actual costs of
previously installed "embedded" facilities and instead estimates costs based on
assumption the ILEC is using the most efficient telecommunications technology
currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, whether that is the
case or not the LEC is actually using them. For background on TELRIC pricing,
see Jim Chen, TELRIC in Turmoil, Telecommunications in Transition: A Note
on the Iowa Utilities Board Litigation, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51 (1998);
Gary J. Guzzi, Breaking Up the Local Telephone Monopolies: The Local
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 39 B.C. L. REv.
151 (1997).
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C. Using the Internet to Carry Telecommunications
Services Provides Extraordinary Cost Savings and
Regulatory Advantages
The FCC has developed a dichotomy between basic
telecommunications and enhanced, information services with an
eye toward limiting regulation to the first category and stimulating
innovation and investment in the second category. 80 However, this
laudable regulatory restraint creates arbitrage opportunities when
unregulated, enhanced service providers offer something
functionally equivalent to what regulated telecommunications
service providers offer. The FCC acknowledges that now
widespread offering of Internet Protocol ("IP") telephony by
unregulated ISPs and other ventures "threatens to erode access
revenues for LECs because it is exempt from the access charges
that traditional long-distance carriers must pay.
81
One can properly infer that if Internet telephony migrates
revenues from LECs then consumers consider this service an
alternative to conventional dial-up telephone service provided by
LECs. Migration of LEC revenues from Internet telephony
82
occurs at the same time as wireless mobile telephone services
make similar inroads. 83 Declining wireline revenues coupled with
80 For background on the Computer Inquiries, see Robert Cannon, The Legacy of
the Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 167 (2003).
81 Bill and Keep Carrier Compensation Proposal, supra note 5, at 9657.
82 Currently VOIP [Voice Over Intemet Protocol] accounts for
less than 3% of global voice phone calls, according to an
AT&T estimate. But a number of trends are working in its
favor, say industry executives: the boom in demand; the
evolution of the technology, which permits companies to offer
services beyond the reach of conventional phones; and the
spread of broadband connections, which make VOIP much
easier to use.
Peter Grant & Almar Latour, Battered Telecoms Face New Challenge: Internet
Calling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at Al.
83 "Notably, 3 to 5 percent of wireless customers use their wireless phone as
their only phone. Some carriers attribute, at least in part, the recent drop in
wireline switched access lines to this replacement of wireline phones by wireless
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the '96 Act required interconnection obligations on favorable rates
has significantly impacted ILEC profitability and stock market
attractiveness. To the extent that ILECs serve as the carrier of last
resort in many localities, the financial vulnerability of ILECs has
important public policy implications. Similarly, the migration of
revenues off ILEC networks means that subsidy mechanisms, such
as the Universal Service Fund, will need remedial reworking. As
enhanced service providers and ISPs do not make universal service
funding contributions, users of conventional dial-up services may
face an even greater burden.
84
The FCC previously has acknowledged the potential for
Internet telephony to compete with dial-up services, but so far has
decided not to remove the favorable unregulated classification.
85
The Commission may have to rethink its decision in view of the
growing traffic migration and recent attempts by several states to
treat Internet telephony as a regulated service. For example, the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission recently issued a ruling
86
classifying Internet telephony as telecommunications, subject to its
regulatory oversight which would include common carrier rate
regulation. An appellate court overturned this ruling based on
grounds of federal preemption.
87
State regulatory commission assertion of jurisdiction over
Internet telephony sets the stage for yet another battle whether the
FCC should preempt the states from making inconsistent,
"balkanizing" policies, or whether states have a lawful right to
phones." Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, 2003 WL 22175730, at 53 (Aug. 21, 2003).
84 See Rob Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 395, 395-433 (2000).
85 See, e.g., Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,830
(1998).
86 Complaint of the Minnesota Department of Commerce Against Vonage
Holding Corp. Regarding Lack of Authority to Operate in Minnesota, Docket
No. P-6214/C-03-108 (Sept. 11, 2003), available at http://www.puc.state.mn.us/
docs/orders/03-0108.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
87 See Vonage Holding Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, No. Civ. 03-5287,
2004 WL 114983 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2004).
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establish telecommunications policies appropriate for
circumstances particular to an individual state. The borderless
nature of the Internet makes this jurisdiction question more
troublesome. One could consider Internet access as involving the
use of local exchange lines regardless of whether interconnection
with interstate lines takes place to reach points outside the state
where traffic originated. Under this interpretation, Internet access
via a LEC would trigger a reciprocal compensation obligation
when the LEC hands off traffic to another carrier, e.g., a CLEC
affiliate of an ISP. Alternatively, the local origination could be
considered in the context of the complete link into the World Wide
Web, almost always involving an interstate or international
routing.
In 1999, the FCC declared that ISP-bound traffic is
"jurisdictionally mixed and appears to be largely interstate." 88 In
a declaratory ruling, the FCC concluded that dial-up Internet traffic
is interstate and not local in nature, an interpretation that would
foreclose application of the reciprocal compensation requirement.8 9
However, the Commission stated its intent to defer to state
regulatory agency decisions addressing the issue, including
whether to continue enforcing existing intercarrier interconnection
agreements, pending the issuance of federal rules. In most
instances state regulatory agencies have considered Internet access
to constitute a local service based on the view that customers
typically access ISPs by dialing a local, toll-free seven digit
telephone number. The state regulatory agencies consider the
onward interconnection with the Internet to occur via a separate
interconnection, despite the fact that both links occur jointly and
seamlessly, i.e., the consumer accesses the Internet via one
telephone call. An analysis that considers Internet access in terms
88 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound
Traffic, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 3690 (1999), vacated by, Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (FCC ordered to explain
why local exchange carrier termination of ISP calls are not local in nature).
89 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound
Traffic, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999).
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of two linked calls qualifies the first leg as local and therefore
subject to the reciprocal compensation arrangement. An analysis
that considers Internet access in terms of one call more easily
exempts such links from the reciprocal compensation arrangement,
because Internet links may take place anywhere and many occur
outside the state where the call first originated.
The FCC's declaratory ruling was appealed to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals which remanded it to the Commission for
having failed to explain why LECs that terminate calls to ISPs are
not properly seen as terminating local telecommunications traffic
instead of interstate traffic.90 The court also required the FCC to
explain why the LEC service of routing Internet traffic constitutes
"exchange access," rather than "telephone exchange service."
Local exchange carriers provide the former when originating and
terminating long distance telephone traffic, while the latter
involves conventional local service subject to the reciprocal
compensation requirement.
On remand, the FCC reaffirmed its conclusion that traffic
delivered to an ISP is interstate, and Commission ordered a
transition to "bill and keep" cost recovery whereby both LECs and
ISPs recover costs from their own customers without the carriers
compensating each other. On a second appeal the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded, but did not reverse, the
FCC on the narrow grounds that the Commission could not have
relied on section 25 1(g) of the '96 Act to carve out a "bill and
keep," zero compensation arrangement for calls to ISPs. 91 That
section did not provide the basis for a substantive change in policy
as it only authorized the FCC to maintain LEC regulatory duties
that predated enactment of the '96 Act in the transition to the new
requirements established by the '96 Act.
Having twice decided that Internet access constitutes an
interstate service, the FCC had to confront the question whether
local and intrastate service customers should bear any of the costs
incurred by LECs to handle traffic received from or destined to
90 See Bell AtL, 206 F.3d at 8-9.
91 Worldcom, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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ISPs. In ACS ofAnchorage v. FCC,9  which involved an FCC
finding that a LEC exceeded its permissible rate of return, the
carrier claimed that the FCC could not lawfully require it to
allocate to its intrastate services the traffic-sensitive costs
associated with calls routed to and from ISPs. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged that cost allocation decisions
parallel jurisdictional ones such that having deemed Internet access
interstate, the Commission should not have objected to a LEC's
allocation of costs to interstate rate payers. However, the court
noted that "deviation from the jurisdictional norm [can exist]
where the Commission was implementing (a) an interim
ratemaking solution (b) justified by a substantial policy
objective. 93 The court affirmed the FCC's decision to prohibit
allocating Internet access costs to interstate services as consistent
with the Commission's previous policy initiative to exempt
enhanced and information service providers from having to pay
interstate access charges. The court also noted that the interim
nature of the FCC's policy supported deference.
IV. All Regulatory Asymmetries Need Review and
Justification
Regulatory asymmetries have the mixed impact of
distorting markets ostensibly to achieve public policy objectives.
Even as they may promote incipient competition and other
laudable goals, regulatory asymmetries typically provide arbitrage
opportunities for crafty users and entrepreneurial market entrants.
Often the financial gains accruing to arbitrageurs reduce the
positive impact of the policies which justified inconsistent
regulatory treatment in the first place. The resulting market
distortions tilt the competitive playing field in favor of one class of
stakeholder over another by adding or reducing financial burdens.
92 290 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
93 d. at 408.
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A. Remove Cost Differentials for Functionally
Equivalent Network Access
Absent ongoing and compelling policy justifications,
legislatures and regulators should not create financial handicaps or
advantages between competitors. Decision makers need to
calibrate their promotional efforts, which include favorable cost
allocation policies, so that opportunities exist to generate
competition in previously monopolized markets. However, such
procompetitive initiatives cannot so linger as to become an
entitlement for the class of beneficiaries.
Institutionalizing inequitable cost allocations and resulting
cost differentials can adversely impact the prospect for competition
by artificially enhancing the prospects for market entrants. For
example, one could argue that too much venture capital flowed
into the CLEC market based in part on the promotional actions of
Congress and the FCC.94 ISPs created CLEC affiliates to qualify
for mandatory reciprocal compensation from ILEC. CLECs
qualified for '96 Act mandated resale and unbundled network
access opportunities at quite favorable forward-looking costs.
While such promotional efforts may have made sense to stimulate
market entry in the short run, adverse outcomes result when the
efforts stimulate too much entry based on the unreasonable
expectation that temporary financial advantages will remain for the
foreseeable future. The longer such promotional policies remain in
place, the more legitimate are incumbents' arguments that the
competitive playing field remains unfairly tilted. As well,
promotional policies become the focal point for litigation and other
strategies designed to thwart the newcomer advantage instead of
the stimulus for more extensive facilities-based competition.
94 See, e.g., Reinhardt Krause, "Market Exuberance" One Factor in Failure of
Telecom Start-Ups; Study Says FCC Played a Role; of 300 Local Phone Firms
Existing, Three Years Ago, 70 Remained by Mid-02, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Sept. 27, 2002, at A5 (noting that the FCC may have created rules encouraged
CLECs to expand too rapidly via leased lines instead of a slower pace required
when building their own networks).
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B. Apply Market Driven, Internet Access Models
Where Possible
Interconnection and facilities access arrangements for
networks that make up the Internet widely vary as a function of
market conditions. For the most part throughout the world
regulators have refrained from meddling. A robust, fully
redundant "network of networks" 95 has evolved among operators
with different subscriber bases, transmission capacity,
geographical scope of operation and market share. The types of
interconnection options range from zero cost "peering" 96 among
the largest Tier-I ISPs, to a one-way, calling party's network pay
95 "The Internet is a large 'network of networks."' There is no
one network known as The Internet; rather, regional nets like
SuraNet, PrepNet, NearNet, et al., are all inter-connected (nay,
"inter-networked") together into one great living thing,
communicating at amazing speeds with the TCP/IP protocol.
All activity takes place in "real-time."
BRENDAN P. KEHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF THE INTERNET, available at
http://www.cs.indiana.edu/docproject/zen/zen- 1.0_3 .html#SEC7 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
96 "In general, peering is settlements-free, i.e., the providers do not charge each
other for terminating traffic. Also, one peer will not allow traffic from another
peer to transit its network to a third provider." Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 105 n.240 (1999) (citing WorldCom, Inc. & MCI
Communications Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025, 143-46 (1998)).
Interconnection agreements between Internet backbone
providers are reached through commercial negotiations in a
'handshake' environment. Internet backbones interconnect
under two different arrangements: peering or transit. In a
peering arrangement, backbones agree to exchange traffic with
each other at no cost. The backbones only exchange traffic
that is destined for each other's end users, not the end users of
a third party. In a transit arrangement, on the other hand, one
backbone pays another backbone for interconnection. In
exchange for this payment, the transit supplier provides a
connection to all end users on the Internet.
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 45, 45 (2003).
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arrangement. Market forces, including the type of number of
available network access options, impact whether any particular
ISP pays, receives payment, or engages in a zero cost peering
arrangement to achieve network interconnection.
97
For Internet networks, commercially driven contracts
typically establish a bill and keep arrangement, where traffic flows
are at or near parity. At their own expense, Internet operators build
or lease telecommunications lines that reach an interconnection
point. At the interconnection point, carriers agreeing to a bill and
keep arrangement accept traffic and route it onward to the final
destination or to another network access point. For instances
where one network supplies more traffic that it receives, based on
such factors as network capacity, geographical scope of service
and subscriber numbers, the smaller network typically incurs all
costs to reach an interconnection point and agrees to pay larger
networks for carriage from that interconnection point onward to
other interconnection points, or to final destinations. In most
Internet network routing scenarios, operators large and small have
access options without the need for regulatory intervention.
C. Markets Apply Traditional Antitrust Analysis for
Insufficiently Competitive
The market-driven interconnection regime for the Internet
provides the ideal model for all telecommunications networks.
However, current market conditions in telecommunications do not
fully match the Internet, particularly for first and last mile access to
residences and businesses outside central business districts. For
these markets regulators must remain vigilant against the potential
for bottlenecks 98 to persist. Where bottlenecks remain, the
97 See Rob Frieden, Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral
Intervention?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 361 (2001).
98 A bottleneck constitutes a potential choke point in the flow of commerce. In
telecommunications and Internet traffic, a bottleneck exists where traffic tends
to back up due to congestion or limitations in the ability of the facility to handle
the volume of traffic sent. Robert B. Friedrich, Regulatory and Antitrust
Implications of Emerging Competition in Local Access Telecommunications:
How Congress and the FCC Can Encourage Competition and Technological
Progress in Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 646, 659 (1995); see
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incumbent service provider may have the incentive and the ability
to engage in anticompetitive practices. For example, some ILECs
historically may have engaged in price squeezes 99of competitors
by charging higher local exchange access prices to unaffiliated
ventures while offering lower prices to affiliates. Additionally,
ILECs have discriminated in favor of affiliates by offering them
better quality interconnections, more timely responses to new
orders and repair requests, sharing customer network information,
and integrating equipment in ways that provide affiliates with
competitive advantages.
For insufficiently competitive markets, regulators should
engage in traditional antitrust analysis to assess the level of market
concentration and dominance by firms. If necessary, regulators
should apply traditional antitrust remedies including the
determination that incumbents operate essential facilities, 00 a
also Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet. Technical And
Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1011, 1013-14 (2000); Michael T. Osborne, The Unfinished Business of
Breaking Up "Ma Bell." Implementing Local Telephone Competition in the
Twenty-first Century, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000), at
http://www.richmond.edu/'jolt/admin/v7i 1/note 1.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
99 If a BOC charges its competitors prices for inputs that are
higher than the prices charged, or effectively charged, to the
BOC's affiliate, then the BOC can create a "price squeeze."
In that circumstance, the BOC affiliate could lower its retail
price to reflect its unfair cost advantage, and competing
providers would be forced either to match the price reduction
and absorb profit margin reductions or maintain their retail
prices at existing levels and accept reductions in their market
shares. If the price squeeze was severe enough and continued
long enough, the BOC affiliate's market share could become
so large, and the competitors so weakened, that the affiliate
could unilaterally raise and sustain a price above competitive
levels by restricting its output.
Implementation of Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended and Regulatory Treatment of LEC
Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in the LEC's Local Exchange
Area, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,877, 18,886 (1996), modifiedby 12 F.C.C.R. 8653 (1997).
100 For a review of the essential facilities doctrine, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J.
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1999); Robert
Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Law (2002), at
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concept much like common carriage that imposes a duty to provide
access, but on fully compensatory terms.
D. Make Subsidy Obligations Equal Among
Competitors
Subsidies, designed to achieve public policy objectives
such as universal service, should not become an additional vehicle
for regulatory arbitrage. The FCC has worked to eliminate implicit
subsidies borne by carriers, by shifting the financial burden
directly to users. However, the transition to explicit subsidies has
not finished at both federal and state levels such that financial
burdens remain unevenly assigned as a function of regulatory
classification. When regulatory classifications do not parallel
market segmentations, as is the case with circuit switched (dial-up)
and packet switched (Internet) telephony, regulatory beneficiaries
avoid subsidy obligations borne by competitors.
Even at the risk of a perceived expanded regulatory
wingspan the FCC should require all carriers to bear an equitable
share of subsidy obligations. Arguably a larger pool of
contributors should reduce the financial burden borne by any
individual operator and its customers. As well a larger pool of
contributors might create greater political pressure to revamp the
subsidy process by making it more transparent and possibly by
reducing the burden and transferring it entirely to telephone service
subscribers or the general taxpayer.
Until the burden shifts to users or taxpayers, a gapping
regulatory loophole allows Internet telephony operators to avoid
paying access charges and contributing to universal service
funding. While the volume of Internet telephony minutes has not
yet significantly reduced the funds available to support universal
service, the numbers grow and the potential for harm exists. Even
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/pitofskyrobert.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); John T. Soma et al.,
The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications
Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 565, 613 (1998); Thomas A Piraino, Jr., An
Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1 (1998).
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now users and carriers alike see the monetary benefit in migrating
to Internet telephony regardless of whether the shift makes
technological and operational sense.
E. Reject Legacy Regulatory Classifications When
Conditions Change or When Incumbents Enter New
Markets
Too many regulatory asymmetries remain in place even
though the public policy justifications no longer make sense.
Regulatory lag' °' or inertia accounts for some of the delay, but it
also appears that stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries of
regulatory asymmetries, successfully argue against change.
Internet telephony advocates argue for the still acute need for
regulators to promote new technologies and viable, sustainable
competition. Market entrants in general assert the need for policies
that reduce their cost of doing business vis-A-vis incumbents.
Worse yet, incumbents condition capital expenditures for new
facilities on regulators' commitments to exempt the investments
from common carrier access requirements, no matter how essential
to sustainable broadband competition and other public interest
objectives.
When a major regulatory dichotomy exists based on service
classifications, such as regulated basic versus unregulated
enhanced services, stakeholders work tirelessly to shoehorn their
offerings into the unregulated category. In a new disappointing
trend, the FCC itself has engaged in the exercise of crafting
101 A regulatory lag is a delay between a change in market
conditions or production technology and the adjustment of
regulations that are based on those factors. Though regulatory
lags are sometimes considered a source of regulatory
inefficiency, they can also create incentives for utilities to
improve efficiency to capture some of the rewards associated
with their innovations before regulated prices adjust
downward. Regulators can exploit regulatory lags-for
example, through price cap regulation-as part of their
regulatory strategy.
Leading Cases, I. Federal Statutes and Regulations, K. Telecommunications
Act, 116 HARV. L. REv. 442, 445 (2002).
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flexible service classifications. The FCC previously sought to
establish a "bright line" separation between basic and enhanced
services. The Commission acknowledged that its basic/enhanced
dichotomy created an either/or proposition.' °2 Now ostensibly to
remove asymmetry in its treatment of broadband access service the
Commission proposes to reclassify a basic service and make it
enhanced. 10 3 The FCC has proposed to treat as an enhanced
service ILEC upgrades to copper wire local loops, commonly
known as Digital Subscriber Links. The Commission previously
deemed the copper wire local loop as basic, telecommunications
102 [T]he categories of "telecommunications service" and
"information service" in the 1996 Act are mutually exclusive.
Reading the statute closely, with attention to the legislative
history, we conclude that Congress intended these new terms
to build upon frameworks established prior to the passage of
the 1996 Act. Specifically, we find that Congress intended the
categories of "telecommunications service" and "information
service" to be mutually exclusive, like the definitions of "basic
service" and "enhanced service" developed in our Computer II
proceeding, and the definitions of "telecommunications" and
"information service" developed in the Modification of Final
Judgment that divested the Bell Operating Companies from
AT&T.
Federal-State Joint Board On Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,507
(1998).
103 The FCC first proposed to classify Internet access via cable television
facilities as an information service. Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3029 (2002);
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000); Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13
F.C.C.R. 24,012, 24,029 (1998) (finding that advanced services such as DSL
constitute telecommunications services when offered to the public directly or on
a stand-alone basis). The FCC may not have found an easy and expedient way
to establish regulatory parity between DSL and cable modem Internet access.
See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002) (proposing to treat broadband services provided via cable television
networks as enhanced services), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom.
Brand X Internet Serv. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting the FCC's determination that a separate
telecommunications service component does not exist).
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service, including broadband improvements. 10 4 Now by sleight of
hand the telecommunications component becomes subordinated to
the information transported over conventional copper wires.,
05
The FCC need not have resorted to such clumsy
reclassifications. It could simply state its unwillingness to extend
legacy regulatory classifications when conditions change and when
incumbents and newcomers alike use new technologies. The
Commission has eschewed extending legacy regulation if doing so
expands its regulatory wingspan. But the same logic supports it
refraining from extending an unregulated classification when a
previously exempt operator begins to offer basic services.
This means that incumbent common carriers do not have to
bear the basic services, common carrier burden when they combine
both the still regulated basic and unregulated enhanced services.
Telecommunications services, whether offered separately or
bundled with information services, should remain regulated.
Similarly, enhanced and information services offered by an
incumbent do not become regulated simply because the incumbent
bears the legacy of having been previously regulated as a common
carrier. Once a common carrier, not always a common carrier.
Likewise, operators that have a legacy of not bearing the
basic services, common carrier burden should not avoid this status
when and if they provide basic services. An ISP that enters the
long distance telephone business should not successfully wrap
itself around its legacy unregulated status as an Internet access
provider. By taking the affirmative step to become a telephone
company competitor, Internet telephony operators have to accept
the regulatory burdens that accompany that decision. These
responsibilities include providing access to 911 emergency
services and the ability to pass along carrier number codes.' 06
105 See Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in
Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New
Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L. J. 207, 227-32 (2003) (analysis of the
proposed regulatory conversion of DSL from the basic to enhanced services
category).
106 Over the last four decades, access to 911 service has
dramatically improved the ability of emergency personnel to
respond quickly to people in distress. Efforts by the
Other responsibilities include providing access services to the
hearing impaired, 10 7 the responsibility to contribute to universal
service funding and the obligation to compensate LECs for the use
of their facilities. Just because a telephone call traverses the
Internet at some point in its routing does not change the fact that
delivery to intended call recipients involves the use of the local
exchange in ways identical to conventional circuit switched long
distance call origination and termination.
V. Conclusion
Regulatory asymmetries become more unjustifiable when
technological innovations make it easier for stakeholders to exploit
differences in financial burdens. Regulatory arbitrage confers
artificial advantages to clever entrepreneurs and cost savings to
sophisticated users while other less nimble competitors and
customers suffer. Even the public interest justifications for many
regulatory asymmetries wane as technological and marketplace
conditions change. This article has suggested that legislatures and
regulators abandon all instances of inconsistent regulatory
treatment of functionally equivalent services absent still
identifiable public interest justifications. Incubating and
telecommunications industry, state and local governments, and
the federal government have resulted in wireline 911 service
being available to approximately 98 percent of the population.
Congress found 911 service to be of such importance that it
enacted a statute codifying 9-1-1 as the national emergency
telephone number.... Today, wireline local exchange
carriers provide 911 services generally pursuant to state or
local provisions.
Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced
911 Emergency Calling Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,576, 25,577 (2002).
107 Each common carrier providing telephone voice transmission
services shall, not later than 3 years after July 26, 1990,
provide in compliance with the regulations prescribed under
this section, throughout the area in which it offers service,
telecommunications relay services, individually, through
designees, through a competitively selected vendor, or in
concert with other carriers.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (2001).
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promoting incipient competition should not serve as the basis for
longstanding inconsistent regulatory burdens. Likewise the
reticence to extend legacy regulation should not foreclose
decisions to subject to regulation the services of previously
unregulated ventures when such new services compete with
regulated incumbent services.
Regulators need to guard against the unintended
consequences of well-intended policies designed ostensibly to
achieve public policy goals. Too often clever applications of a
favorable or promotional regulatory treatment end up benefiting
ventures that cannot or will not achieve the goals sought by
regulators. A CLEC affiliate of an ISP, which receives traffic from
an ILEC but offers no return traffic, games the reciprocal
compensation plan envisioned by Congress and implemented by
the FCC. The ISP affiliate accrues revenues without promoting
true facilities-based competition for local exchange services. The
affiliate receives payments from ILECs without having to invest in
physical plant and without achieving any improvement in universal
service, pricing levels for local services or routing diversity. At
least Internet telephony service providers pass on to consumers
some of their cost savings. But even these operators exploit
regulatory loo ,holes first and offer technological innovations
secondarily.'
0
The opportunities for gaming the regulatory system appear
to have grown rather than narrowed as a product of technological
innovations, enactment of the '96 Act and longstanding FCC
regulatory classifications such as the basic/enhanced services
dichotomy. The FCC should eliminate regulatory asymmetries
that provide little more than unjust enrichment to one group and
unjust financial burdens on others.
108 Internet telephony providers soon may face some regulatory oversight. See
Chdrie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are
Regulators Poised to Address the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 19 (2003).
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